Detecting Social Spamming on Facebook Platform by Mohamed, Ghada Zakaria
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Institute of Computer Science
Cyber Security Curriculum
Ghada Zakaria
Detecting Social Spamming on Facebook
Platform
Master’s Thesis (30 ECTS)
Supervisor: Innar Liiv
Supervisor: Raimundas Matulevicˇius
Tartu 2018
Detecting Social Spamming on Facebook Platform
Abstract:
OSNs (Online Social Networks) are dominating the human interaction nowadays, easing
the communication and spreading of news on one hand and providing a global fertile soil
to grow all different kinds of social spamming, on the other. Facebook platform, with its
2 billions current active users, is currently on the top of the spammers’ targets. Its users
are facing different kind of social threats everyday, including malicious links, profanity,
hate speech, revenge porn and others. Although many researchers have presented their
different techniques to defeat spam on social media, specially on Twitter platform, very
few have targeted Facebook’s. To fight the continuously evolving spam techniques, we
have to constantly develop and enhance the spam detection methods. This research
digs deeper in the Facebook platform, through 10 implemented honeypots, to state
the challenges that slow the spam detection process, and ways to overcome it. Using
all the given inputs, including the previous techniques tested on other social medias
along with observations driven from the honeypots, the final product is a classifier
that distinguish the spammer profiles from legitimate ones through data mining and
machine learning techniques. To achieve this, the research first overviews the main
challenges and limitations that obstruct the spam detection process, and presents the
related researches with their results. It then, outlines the implementation steps, from
the honeypot construction step, passing through the data collection and preparation and
ending by building the classifier itself. Finally, it presents the observations driven from
the honeypot and the results from the classifier and validates it against the results from
previous researches on different social platforms. The main contribution of this thesis
is the end classifier which will be able to distinguish between the legitimate Facebook
profiles and the spammer ones. The originality of the research lies in its aim to detect all
kind of social spammers, not only the spreading-malware spammers, but also spamming
in its general context, e.g. the ones spreading profanity, bulk messages and unapproved
contents.
Keywords:
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Sotsiaalse rämpspostituse avastamine Facebooki platvormil
Lühikokkuvõte:
Tänapäeval toimub väga suur osa kommunikatsioonist elektroonilistes suhtlusvõrgustikes.
Ühest küljest lihtsustab see omavahelist suhtlemist ja uudiste levimist, teisest küljest loob
see ideaalse pinnase sotsiaalse rämpsposti levikuks. Rohkem kui kahe miljardi kasutajaga
Facebooki platvorm on hetkel rämpsposti levitajate üks põhilisi sihtmärke. Platvormi ka-
sutajad puutuvad igapäevaselt kokku ohtude ja ebameeldivustega nagu pahavara levitavad
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lingid, vulgaarsused, vihakõned, kättemaksuks levitatav porno ja muu. Kuigi uurijad on
esitanud erinevaid tehnikaid sotsiaalmeedias rämpspostituste vähendamiseks, on neid
rakendatud eelkõige Twitteri platvormil ja vaid vähesed on seda teinud Facebookis.
Pidevalt arenevate rämpspostitusmeetoditega võitlemiseks tuleb välja töötada järjest uusi
rämpsposti avastamise viise. Käesolev magistritöö keskendub Facebook platvormile,
kuhu on lõputöö raames paigutatud kümme „meepurki” (ingl honeypot), mille abil
määratakse kindlaks väljakutsed rämpsposti tuvastamisel, et pakkuda tõhusamaid la-
hendusi. Kasutades kõiki sisendeid, kaasa arvatud varem mujal sotsiaalmeedias testitud
meetodid ja informatsioon „meepurkidest”, luuakse andmekaeve ja masinõppe mee-
toditele tuginedes klassifikaator, mis suudab eristada rämpspostitaja profiili tavakasutaja
profiilist. Nimetatu saavutamiseks vaadeldakse esmalt peamisi väljakutseid ja piiranguid
rämpsposti tuvastamisel ning esitletakse varasemalt tehtud uuringuid koos tulemustega.
Seejärel kirjeldatakse rakenduslikku protsessi, alustades „meepurgi” ehitusest, andmete
kogumisest ja ettevalmistamisest kuni klassifikaatori ehitamiseni. Lõpuks esitatakse
„meepurkidelt” saadud vaatlusandmed koos klassifikaatori tulemustega ning võrreldakse
neid uurimistöödega teiste sotsiaalmeedia platvormide kohta. Selle lõputöö peamine
panus on klassifikaator, mis suudab eristada Facebooki kasutaja profiilid spämmerite
omast. Selle lõputöö originaalsus seisneb eesmärgis avastada erinevat sotsiaalset spämmi,
mitte ainult pahavara levitajaid vaid ka neid, kes levitavad roppust, massiliselt sõnumeid,
heakskiitmata sisu jne.
Võtmesõnad:
sotsiaalmeedium, meepurk, Facebook, spämm, rämpspost, tuvastus , masinõpe
CERCS: P170 Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine (automaatjuhtim-
isteooria)
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the Social Media in the 90’s, concerns were raised about its
security, ethical aspects, potential for misuse, psychological effects and more. Since
then, continuously, there were always updated statistics showing its dangerous side and
discussing solutions to minimize the threats. In this thesis, the author summarizes some
of the efforts done before to detect and decrease the threat of social spamming using data
mining and machine learning algorithms.
Although the word spam usually refers to the malicious contents e.g. malware, in this
research, spam will be considered in its general context, e.g. any unwanted text, requests,
posts, and photos, including for example, unwanted advertisement, requests targeting
wrong persons, nude photos targeting under-aged children, blackmailing ex-partners with
intimate photos, profanity and so on ..
The research starts with defining the problems needed to be solved and the scope of
the implementation. It then covers the evolution of the spam detection approaches
done through the years 2008 till 2017- and the accuracy of their results, as well as the
development of the Facebook platform itself. Implementation of the honeypots and the
observation driven from its findings are presented in sections 3 and 4. Finally, the results
from the implemented classifiers are presented and validated against results from the
previous researches.
1.1 Problem Statement
As will be highlighted in the background section, most of the researches dealing with
social spamming problems were performed on the Twitter platform for different reasons
including, the ease of implementing and gathering information through the honeypot and
its already available databases to use. The aim of this research is to integrate different
spam detection attributes and feed the results to a classifier that can detect spam profiles
on Facebook Platform.
Facebook platform was chosen as it currently has more than 2 billion users 1,2 verses 330
millions on Twitter3! The statistics’ results crown Facebook platform on the top of the
most used application worldwide4. Also Facebook integrates with and access the data of
a lot of other applications, including Instagram, Goodreads, Snapchat and more.
For set of users U = {u1, u2, u3, ..., ui} who each has a profile p with attributes A =
{a1, a2, a3, ....aj} which maps to different profile’s attributes, like ID, name, gender,
1Mark Zuckerberg - Post #10103831654565331
2Statista - Active Facebook users worldwide as of 3rd quarter 2017
3Statista - Active Twitter users worldwide from 1st quarter 2010 to 3rd quarter 2017
4Techcrunch - Facebook now has 2 billion monthly users
8
friends’ number and so on, the target classifier C should be able to distinguish if user uk
is a spammer, or legitimate user given the information from profile pk .
C|pk → {Spammer, Legitimate User}
1.2 Research Questions
The research targets answering specifically the below questions :
• What is the applicability of implementing a stable honeypot profile on the Facebook
platform?
• What is the reliability of a social honeypot to attract only social spammers on
Facebook platform?
• What is the effectiveness of the targeted classifier to identify spam profiles on
Facebook?
• What contribution does the classifier add to better spam detection more over than
the currently implemented spam detection techniques on Facebook?
• Finally, what is the correctness of the proposed classifier with respect to results
from Twitter platform, the most tested social platform in the previous researches,
from the accuracy prospective.
1.3 Main Tools
1.3.1 R-Language
The language and environment of the classifier will be R5; which is most suitable for
statistical computing and graphics and provides different ways to integrate between
Facebook and some Linux commands in the back-end. Also R will be used in the text-
mining steps needed to compare the contents of a profile information or a shared post
against some keywords commonly used by spammers.
1.3.2 Graph API Explorer
The API6 is the primary way that data is retrieved from or posted to Facebook. The current
version of the API 2.11 and was released in November’2017. The API provides the
developer with a token, for 2 hours every time, through which the developer can connect
to the API through various environment including R, PHP SDK, and curl command.
5R-project
6Facebook Graph API
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Through the API, information of the honeypot can be extracted, its friend-list, posts
available to it, and much more.
1.3.3 CURL command
For extracting the information from the Graph API, sometimes the curl command is more
convenient than R. The command has all the Graph API’s action available to be done
through it, while R is limited to fewer permissions. While R is the main environment, curl
command can be used to pull the data, and then easily integrated with more commands
to prepare the data and save it to be used later by R in the analysis stage. Also, the
command will be used to communicate with the various virus-scanners APIs and the
results will be cleaned, organized and prepared to be used by the R-based classifier.
1.4 Scope and Limitations
1.4.1 Honeypot
According to the Facebook community standards, people should connect through their
real personal identity, and Facebook team has the right to disable a profile if the owner
could not prove their identity7. Furthermore, connecting with several suspicious profiles
and accepting many friend requests in a short time period questions the authenticity of
the honeypot profile and Facebook team will directly disable the honeypot till I am able
to prove that the profile belongs to a real person with this exact name 8. As a result, I am
planning to implement several parallel honeypot profiles and continuously create more
as each is taken down by Facebook team.
1.4.2 Facebook Graph API
Until version 2.39, the Graph API supported a lot of features to extract information.
Starting from V2.4 the security concerns and restriction disabled many permissions, e.g.
manually extracting friends’ list and their basic information, extracting the home feed,
and extracting the private messages. The target from using the Graph API will be to
utilize as much function as needed to automate the extraction of maximum amount of
data, while the rest of information will be extracted manually or by the aid of other codes
and extensions, e.g. DataMiner extension on Chrome10.
7Facebook: Authentic-Identity
8Facebook Help Center - What types of ID does Facebook accept?
9Facebook for Developers - Changelog
10Data Miner
10
1.4.3 Data Sets’ Sizes
Since Graph API will not help extracting enough information for the honeypot’s friends,
messages, or home feed, I will have to manually extract the information into a database.
Information include friend’s age, occupation, education, number of friends, and activity
rate. This will consume much time, and will force me to be bounded by the amount I
can gather in a given period of time. Since the training and testing database are expected
to be small, in the classification stage, I will use the K-fold cross validation to test the
classifier against several random data sets.
1.4.4 Legal and Ethical Concerns
There are different legal and ethical considerations regarding communicating with the
added profiles, both spammers and legitimate, with a false identity, and of course, the
usage of their information in the research without their explicit approval. Most of the
researchers do not precisely present how they overcame this issue. Nevertheless, several
authors have dedicated complete researchers to address the legal and ethical concerns
related to scientific researches on the OSNs and data mining technologies [1, 2, 3].
Researchers around the world seem to have reached consensus about the importance of
independent research on social networks and how they contribute to general social good
and act as a safeguard against the rise of information monopoly and abuses by for-profit
platforms [4, 5, 6]. Also, many entities and conferences are calling for papers to discuss
the OSNs and their impacts in different fields, e.g. education, business, marketing, and
social.11,12,13,14,15,16
Even the Facebook team itself is continuously announcing how far researching on the
platform and using several AI tools to analyze the data is increasing the social quality
that the platform is targeting. Very recently, in November-2017, the team has announced
upgrading their AI tools to identify people who have suicidal thoughts, and be ready to
help them in early stage17.
In March 2017, MIT announced an award for rule-breakers!. "You don’t change the
world by doing what you’re told, you don’t get a Nobel Prize for doing what you’re told,
11IEEE Statistical Signal Processing Workshop
12ASONAM 2018
13ELSEVIER
14Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
15WikiCFP
16Emerald Journals
17Mark Zuckerberg - post #10104242660091961
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you get it for questioning authority." said Joi Ito, the director of MIT’s Media Lab18. Ito
and many other academics and researchers have been fighting a long battle against rigid
laws and rules that are not continuously evolving to meet the exponential advance in
technology. Through the EU Data Protection Directive, the EU has been trying to shape
a frame to regulate the collection and processing of electronic data since 1995. Still,
progress of changing the law to cope with the everyday growth in the digital world is
struggling way behind.
Under EU law, ’personal data’ are defined as "information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person"19. Following the principle of limited retention of data, con-
tained in the Data Protection Directive as well as in Convention 108, data gathered in
this thesis was completely anonymized before even the processing stage starts, since the
personal identification of the profiles are not directly serving the research purpose.
European data protection law specially treats the cases where data collection and pro-
cessing are done for research purposes, as stated in Fig. 1. It sets the ground rules to
follow during data collection and processing, then leaves exact outlines to be defined in
the national laws for each EU country. Estonian law permits the processing of personal
data for scientific research without the approval of its owner in a strict frame that aims
at preventing the identification of the person and avoids further storage of data after the
objective research or statistics have been achieved (Fig. 2).
In relation to science, European data protection law is aware of the special value of
science to society. Therefore, the general restrictions for the use of personal data are
diminished. The Data Protection Directive and Convention 108 both permit the retention
of data for scientific research once they are no longer needed for the initial purpose of
their collection. Furthermore, the subsequent use of personal data for scientific research
shall not be considered an incompatible purpose. National law is charged with the task
of developing more detailed provisions, including the necessary safeguards, to reconcile
the interest in scientific research with the right to data protection.
Figure 1. Segment from section ’Freedom of the arts and sciences’ - Handbook on
European data protection law [7]
Personal data protection is cautiously considered in this work; data involved consists
mainly of bots and spammers. Yet, all data has already been anonymized and will be
completely deleted as soon as this work is published.
18CNN - MIT offers $250,000 award for breaking the rules
19Data Protection Directive, Art. 2 (a); Convention 108, Art. 2 (a).
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§ 16. Processing of personal data for scientific research or official statistics needs
(1) Data concerning a data subject may be processed without the consent of the data
subject for the needs of scientific research or official statistics only in coded form.
Before handing over data for processing it for the needs of scientific research or official
statistics, the data allowing a person to be identified shall be substituted by a code.
Decoding and the possibility to decode is permitted only for the needs of additional
scientific research or official statistics. The processor of the personal data shall appoint a
specific person who has access to the information allowing decoding.
(2) Processing of data concerning a data subject without the person’s consent for
scientific research or official statistics purposes in a format which enables identification
of the data subject is permitted only if, after removal of the data enabling identification,
the goals of data processing would not be achievable or achievement thereof would be
unreasonably difficult. In such case, the personal data of a data subject may be processed
without the person’s consent only if the person carrying out the scientific research finds
that there is a predominant public interest for such processing and the volume of the
obligations of the data subject is not changed on the basis of the processed personal data
and the rights of the data subject are not excessively damaged in any other manner.
(3) Processing of personal data for scientific research or official statistics purposes
without the consent of the data subject is permitted if the processor of the personal
data has taken sufficient organizational, physical and information technology security
measures for the protection of the personal data, has registered the processing of
sensitive personal data and the Data Protection Inspectorate has verified, before the
commencement of the processing of the personal data, compliance with the requirements
set out in this section and, if an ethics committee has been founded based on law in the
corresponding area, has also heard the opinion of such committee.
(4) Collected personal data may be processed for the purposes of scientific research or
official statistics regardless of the purpose for which the personal data were initially
collected. Personal data collected for scientific research or official statistics may be
stored in coded form for the purposes of using it later for scientific research or official
statistics.
Figure 2. Estonian law - Personal Data Protection Act - Section 1620
20Riigi Teataja - Personal Data Protection Act
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2 Background
This section aims at over viewing the past, most-related researches that have been done
in the social spam detection field. It firsts reviews the papers and articles published by
different researchers and summarizes the used techniques and ideas they used to increase
the detection precision on social networks, using photos and charts to best visualize the
different methods and results.
Later, it outlines the main spam detection techniques used by Facebook team and de-
scribes in particular the efforts and results achieved by the Facebook research team in the
area of photo segmentation and object detection, which will be later referred to in this
research.
2.1 Social Honeypots and Classifiers’ Different Techniques
In 2008, S. Webb, J. Caverlee and C. Pu proposed the first social honeypot and technique
for harvesting deceptive spam profiles from social network community [8]. 51 honeypot
profiles were constructed in different geographic locations on MySpace and traffic
through four months (from October 1, 2007 to February 1, 2008) was collected and
analyzed.
The researchers have created their honeypots using algorithms that balances between
staying maximum online time, for MySpace to mark them as active and prioritize them
in the search, and employing a sleep timers to avoid being marked as a spam bot by
MySpace. Once the honeypot profile receives a new friend request from a profile (total
of 1,570 friend requests were received), it downloads the profile’s information along with
the time-stamp of friend request and rejects the request. The bots also examine all the
URLs and pages that are being advertised on these profiles.
The spam profiles collected were categorized as [8] :
• Click Traps : Images are links to other web pages.
• Friend Infiltrators : Their main aim is to collect as many friends as possible.
• Pornographic Storytellers : The "About me" section has random pornographic
stories, and pornographic web pages.
• Japanese Pill Pushers : Advertise for male enhancement pills in their "About me"
sections.
• Winnies : same headline "Hey its winnie", and links to female’s pornographic
pictures.
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The top interesting conclusions from analyzing all these profiles were (as quoted from
their research [8]) :
• The spamming behaviors of spam profiles follow distinct temporal patterns.
• The geographic locations of spam profiles almost never overlap with the locations
of their targets.
• 57.2% of the spam profiles obtain their “About me” content from another profile.
• Many of the spam profiles exhibit distinct demographic characteristics (e.g., age,
relationship status).
• Spam profiles use thousands of URLs and various redirection techniques to funnel
users to a hand full of destination web pages.
Later, in their paper in 2010, Caverlee et al. have discussed the possibility to depend on f
implemented social honeypots to attract the spammers and detect them [9]. They have
proposed the framework shown in Fig. 3 and tested it on 2 social networks, Myspace
and Twitter. They have created 51 generic honeypot profiles on MySpace [10] and
one more on Twitter, and for every profile that sent a friend request to their honepots,
they stored a local copy of that profile, extracted all the hyperlinks in the "About Me"
sections and crawled the pages pointed to by these hyperlinks. From the analysis of
these profiles and the malicious URLs included, the researchers confirmed their first
hypothesis, that using honeypots can successfully attract spammers across fundamentally
different communities.
Figure 3. Overall Framework of Social Honeypot-based Approach [8]
The information gathered was categorized to four broad classes of user attributes for
each to be analyzed for finding the correlation between this feature’s presence and the
possibility of an account to be a spammer. The four main Feature Classes where :
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• User demographics: age, gender, location, ...
• User-contributed content: "About Me" text, blog posts, comments on others’
profiles, tweets, ...
• User activity features: posting rate, tweet frequency, ...
• User connections: number of friends, followers, following, ...
Around 1300 different profiles were examined for both networks. The classification
process was performed using 10-fold cross-validation, and the font analysis was done
by Porter Stemmer and Bigrams techniques. The results were very promising, for the
most effective features to detect a spammer were independent from the ’personality’ a
spammer tried to draw in the "About Me" section on the profile (Fig. 4). Instead, the
features with the highest True Positive Rate were the Contents/tweet’s text, the account
age and the shared URLs. Best results showed 99% of accuracy in the MySpace data
sample and 88% in Twitter’s.
Figure 4. MySpace - Feature Comparison [8](AM : About Me)
The authors tried to deploy their classifier implementation ’in-the-wild’ to test if it will
be as accurate if implemented any place in the world. The problem in this research
challenge was the absence of ground truth data, and so, for evaluating the classifiers, they
adopted the spam precision metric
Spam Precision = true positivestrue positives+false positives
i.e. evaluate only the profiles that the classifier labels as spam. There were 44,000
profiles to test and a human inspector verified whether the newly found predicted spam
was actually spam, and accordingly added instances to training set. Fig. 5 shows the
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Spam Precision when depending on Sexual contents or Advertisement Content. They
have also added a post-filter for the model incorrectly predicted spam labels for profiles
containing special profile layout links, e.g."click here to get a theme for your myspace".
Lee et al. said that these initial results provide positive evidence of the robustness of the
proposed approach.
Figure 5. Spam Precision when analyzing Sexual contents or Advertisement Content [8].
On the same year, 2010, Stringhini et al. have created 900 profiles on Facebook, MyS-
pace, and Twitter (300 on each platform) to collect data over 11-12 months, investigate
spammers’ behavior and characteristics and build a spammer detector based on these
information. The pots were decided to be passive, i.e. they will not send any friend
request. Once it receives a request, the profile pot logged all the information of the
requested profile and all the notifications and private messages it receives. Figures 31
and 7 summarizes Facebook’s and Twitter’s notification rate through the 11-to-12 months
period [11].
From the analysis of the spam profiles’ data, the researchers could divide the spammers
into four main category:
• Displayer : Spam contents are put on his/her profile, and a friend intentionally visit
the profile to check it, and so, it is considered the least effective.
• Bragger : Spammer posts the malicious contents on his own feed, and so, his
friends can view it on their feeds.
• Poster : Spammers who send a direct message to each victim, usually by posting
on their walls, or sharing the malicious contents in a group or so.
• Whisperer : Those who send private messages to their victims requesting that they,
personally and in specific, check a URL to download some files.
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(a) Friend requests received (b) Messages received
Figure 6. Activity observed on Facebook [11]
(a) Users starting following honey-profiles (b) Messages received
Figure 7. Activity observed on Twitter [11]
These 4 categories of spammers can be further divided according to their behavior :
• Greedy bots : When every message contains a malicious content. They are easy to
find and flag as spammers.
• Stealthy bot : Usually sends legitimate messages, and include a spam every now
and then.
Out of the 534 spam bots detected, 416 were greedy and 98 were stealthy. Fig. 8 shows a
summary of the spammers ratio on the three social platforms.
Using machine learning techniques, the authors have decided to use several indexes to
classify spammers and legitimate users (some of them are listed below). Using these
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Figure 8. Spammers ratio on the three social platforms [11].
indexes, a classifier, that uses Random Forest algorithm , was created for both, Facebook
and Twitter platforms and tested.
• FF ratio : Compares the number of friend requests that a user sends to the number
of friends he has. This is based on the idea that this unknown spammers will have
lots of the requests rejected because they do not actually know him.
• URL ratio : The high likelihood of a spammer to send out lots of malicious URLs.
• Message Similarity : The similarity of messages sent by the spammer to different
friends.
• Number of messages sent : Based on the observation that spammers tend to send
more number of messages compared to legitimate users.
The classifier and indexes sensitivity were tunned for each platform for the best results.
Finally, the 10-fold cross validation on this training data set estimated 2% false positive
ratio and 1% false negative ratio on Facebook platform, Vs. 2.5% and 3%, false-positive
ration and false negative ratio respectively on Twitter’s platform.
Meanwhile, an algorithm was proposed to estimate the location of a user based on the
profile’s contents and most used ’local’ word [12]. The researchers then calculated the
accuracy of the algorithm and error in estimated distance. An example is shown in Fig. 9
for the word "rockets" and its occurrence probability according to the location and Fig. 10
summarizes the most commonly used word in each city in the United States.
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Figure 9. City estimates for the term "rockets" [12]
Figure 10. Geographical Centers of Local Words Discovered in Sampled Twitter
Dataset [12]
Song et al. suggested a spam filtering approach based on the relationship between
the sender and receiver [13]. It depends on the distance, or number of hobs between
the message receiver and the message sender, and the correlation between them. The
experiment was conducted on 10,000 legitimate messages and 10,000 spam messages.
While only 0.9% of the messages are spam at distance=1, 89% of the messages are spam
at distance=4. Moreover, the connectivity, i.e. how many common paths/friends, further
confirms the spammer detection. Fig.12 shows the ROC curve comparing the results
using distance alone, and distance + each of the connectivity algorithm.
Fig. 13 shows the construction of the classification tree and the false positive percentage
using different connectivity measurements.
In 2011, Wang et al. suggested a framework that works independent of the social network
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Figure 11. Legitimate(blue) and spam messages(red) Ratio [13]
Figure 12. ROC curves for each of the relation features [13]
platform, i.e. suitable for all social networks [14]. They claimed that once a new type of
spam is detected on one network, it can automatically be identified on the other networks
as well. Fig. 14 overviews the suggested framework.
The main idea is based on creating a 3-stages model:
1. Mapping and Assembly Stage, converts the objects of the social network into
standard objects for the generalized model ((e.g., profile, message, or webpage)
2. Pre-filtering Stage, searches for already-known hashes, URLs, ... that are known
to be spams.
3. Classification Stage, uses supervised machine learning techniques to classify the
objects.
The classifier returns a decision per each model (profile, message, and webpage). The
decisions then are passed to the combined classifier. The four different combination
strategies used were :
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Figure 13. Decision tree, structure and results [13]
• AND strategy: classifies an object as spam if all classifier, for all models, classify
it as spam.
• OR strategy: classifies an object as spam if any of the classifier, classifies it as
spam.
• Majority voting strategy: classifies the object as spam only when majority of
classifier, classify it as spam.
• Bayesian strategy, based on the marginal probability of the joint probabilities of
the classifiers’ output.
Results showed that Naïve Bayes classifier showed the best results (Fig. 15).
By manual inspection, some URLs were found to be misclassified as spam while they are
legitimate. The classifier was further enhanced by white-listing them and tested again.
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Figure 14. Overview of the spam detection framework [14]
Figure 15. The results of Naïve Bayes classifier [14]
Fig. 16 shows the enhanced results.
In their paper in 2013, Hu et al. discussed the implementation and accuracy of their
proposed algorithm, SSDM, to label social spammers in microblogging [15]. Compared
to Least Squares and Elastic Net algorithms, the proposed algorithm showed higher
precision (0.865). For further evaluation of the algorithm, it was tested against support
vector machine (SVM) and elastic net (EN) using 2 methods, Content-based method and
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Figure 16. The results of Naïve Bayes Classifier after whitelisting legitimate sites [14]
Network-based method. Fig.17 compares the SSDM algorithm against the other four
algorithms.
Figure 17. SSDM Performance [15]
In the following year, 2014, the same authors have proposed an online-learning algorithm
to detect social spammer and have compared it to other commonly used techniques and to
offline learning algorithms [16]. The two main algorithms to compare against is the Least
Square, which works on minimizing the error, and BSSD which is the batch version of
the proposed online model. The proposed online algorithm, OSSD, showed the second
best results when compared to four other algorithms. The best result was obtained using
the batch version of the OSSD, BSSD, but the difference was quite close as shown in
Fig. 18.
Using statistical analysis of language, Martinez-Romo and Lourdes Araujo detected the
malicious tweets in the most trending topics on Twitter [17]. A language model is based
on a probability distribution over pieces of text, indicating the likelihood of observing
these pieces in a language. As a simplified example, if the analyzed tweet is about "Justin
Bieber" and the URL included is dedicated to the sale of pharmaceutical products, the
tweet is more likely to be suspicious/malicious.
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Figure 18. Efficiency Performance on Twitter Sample [16]
The model also includes a feedback mechanism by which the user can confirm, for
example, that the spam-labeled tweet is not a spam, and then the model corrects its label
for this specific tweet along with all the related tweets. The architecture of the proposed
model is summarized in Fig.19. Fig. 20 displays the accuracy of the model using different
machine learning techniques and Fig. 21 summarizes the confusion matrix, which shows
that the model is able to detect spam content with accuracy of 89.3% and non-spam
content with accuracy reaching 93.7%.
Figure 19. Feedback mechanism [17]
Recently, in January 2016, Ruan et al. approached the spammer-detection problem from
the other way around[18]. Instead of analyzing the spammers’ behaviors and profiles’
contents, they have analyzed and created a model for the legitimate users and have used
it to compare against for spammer detection. The authors have first categorized the users
to Extroverts, and Introverts, and analyzed each group’s behavior independently. The
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Figure 20. Results for Different classification algorithms [17]
Figure 21. Confusion Matrix [17]
analysis included activity characteristics, browsing preference, sites’ visit duration, and
others.
Beside the various different supervised techniques and algorithms proposed and stud-
ied by different researchers, fewer have tended to use the unsupervised techniques in
spammer-detection problem. Unsupervised technique does not require labeling the pro-
files/contents as legitimate/malicious for the learning phase, and so saves a lot of time
and man power. On the other hand, the main disadvantage of the methods based on
unsupervised learning is that they usually output less accurate results than those based
on supervised ones.
In their paper in 2013 [19], the researchers have discussed the need to find an unsuper-
vised approach with accuracy similar to the supervised ones. The model is constructed
based on the graph data approach. First the contents shared by legitimate users creates
a Whitelist database and then, upon testing, the nodes with these contents are trimmed
from the graph data, so that only the malicious nodes are left behind to be tested. This is
can be clearly illustrated in Fig. 22.
In late 2016 and early 2017, scholars continued searching for different methods and
algorithms to detect the continuously improving spamming techniques, including:
• Sparse Group Modeling to detect outliers that are not following a specific group
structure [20].
• Multi-view learning. The researchers have first worked on proving that singly
relaying on Text Features, URL Features or Hashtag Features, will result in the
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(a) UNIK workflow (b) An example of edge trimming in UNIK
Figure 22. UNIK Framework [19]
same distribution of the spammers/legitimate users, i.e. any of the three features
can indicate almost-equally confirm the spamming behavior [21]. While multi-
viewing increases the detection by around 30%. Also, they have illustrated the need
to complete the missing values in the data sets to assure a more precise spamming
detection.
• Topic-Based model, to detect real-time spammers that are using the tending topics
and hashtags to promote for their malicious links [22]. The research group has
used the Hidden Markov model and could prove its more precises results compared
to other supervised methods (Random Forest and J48 decision tree).
• Comparing the results for online learning and batch learning with considering
different combinations feature sets [23]. The researchers concluded that the ’user
network feature’ and ’user activity features’ were the most robust features against
the different spamming patterns.
• Detecting spammers on Facebook platform based on contents, especially the
comments [24].The researchers have constructed the classifier using Maximum
Entropy method.
• Analyzing public features on Twitter platform to detect the spam tweet’s most
commonly used words, pattern, text-to-link ratio, and related text attributes. [25].
• Detecting spam messages by analyzing the relation between the users involved and
the messages instead of depending on the contents itself [26].
• Detecting spam in closed Facebook groups using social features [27].
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2.2 Facebook Publications and Researches
Facebook Research team is continuously contributing to the research field by finding
solutions to the problems derived from real world 21. The research team also shares the
softwares, platforms, and codes. to be downloaded 22.
Their top research fields are :
• Applied Machine Learning.
• Computer Vision.
• Connectivity.
• Data Science.
• Economics & Computation.
• Facebook AI Research (FAIR).
• Human Computer Interaction & UX.
• Natural Language Processing & Speech.
• Security & Privacy.
• Systems & Networking.
• Virtual Reality.
In this section, the author aims at highlighting the main researches that increases the
platform’s security and helps detect the anomalies .
2.2.1 Object segmentation and Refining
Through several publications [28, 29, 30], Facebook research team have worked on
the image segmentation on both, the object level and the pixel level. And on 25 of
August, 2016, Facebook officially published its artificial intelligence (A.I.) software for
segmenting objects within images on GitHub under a BSD license 23. The goal is to give
the visually impaired persons a different experience when browsing their Facebook’s
account content. The 3-staged detection technique is summarized by Piotr Dollar in the
simple, yet informative, article ’Learning to Segment’ 24 as follows :
21Facebook: Research Areas
22Facebook Immune System
23GitHub: Deepmask
24Facebook Research - Learning to Segment
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1. DeepMask generates initial object masks.
2. SharpMask refines these masks.
3. MultiPathNet identifies the objects delineated by each mask.
Objects’ relationship was addressed in the 2017’s publication ’Relationship proposal
networks’ [31], which aim at finding the relationship between objects within the same
image. The researchers try to identify 3 types relationships: Interactive : which has at
least one object identified as a living being, e.g. a boy flying a kite. Positional : which
tried to identify a position of an object in the space, e.g. a kite in the sky. Attributive :
which aim at finding the relationship between one small-sized object, and another large
one, e.g. a brick in the building.
Fig. 23 visualizes the results targeted by the research team [31].
Figure 23. Object segmentation and Refining: Red and blue boxes are ground-truth
subject and object, yellow and green boxes are outputs from our model [31]
2.2.2 Facebook Spam Detection
In April 2011, the Facebook team has published a paper describing Facebook’s immune
system at that time. Their main target was to protect the Facebook social graphs from
attackers, by first, categorizing the suspicious accounts into three main categories, then
taking the corrective actions accordingly.
• Compromised accounts : that have been stolen from real user, should return to
their legitimate main user.
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• Fake accounts : with no real user / user information, should be blocked.
• Creepers : who are causing inconvenience to other users, e.g. by spreading too
much messages that are considered spam by others, or sending friend requests to
people they dont know. They need to be educated and reminded of the Facebook’s
rules.
It is interesting to note that, although the paper is more than 6 years ago, with Facebook
expanding to more than double number of users (from 750 millions to 2 billions) and
many more spam techniques have been introduced since then, the categorization is
still valid to target. The embedded classifier also considers both, scanning the URLs
posted and their re-occurrence as well as the users’ marking as a spam. Exact details
for the technology and flowchart for the detection system is represented in their paper
"Facebook Immune System" [32]. Later, Facebook strengthened its spam fight using
pure functions25, and Haskell26 to cope with the increase in scalability and complexity of
the platform.
2.2.3 FastText
In August 2016, Facebook team has announced open-sourcing the fastText code. FastText
is used for text classification and word representation using a hierarchical classifier that
categorizes the words in a binary tree structure instead of a flat list using Huffman code. It
participates in the spam detection process by categorizing the bag of words into spam and
non-spam. Word representation also detects the rare words in the context and accordingly,
understand the aim of the text in general. Facebook also uses this information to promote
for related Ads [33, 34]. 27,28
2.2.4 Non-Consensual Intimate Image
The most recent Facebook’s attempt to detect and prevent spam was publicly announced
early in November 2017. Facebook, in cooperation with the Australian eSafety Commis-
sioner’s Office are publishing a pilot that aim at preventing ’revenge porn’ on Facebook
platform. "We don’t want Facebook to be a place where people fear their intimate images
will be shared without their consent.", said Antigone Davis, Global Head of Safety at
Facebook, starting her explanatory article on the 9th of November, 201729. The article
aimed at illustrating the targeted technique and privacy and justifying the need to proceed
with this step, after several writers have outraged their privacy concerns of the process in
25Facebook: Fighting Spam with Pure functions
26Facebook: Fighting Spam with Haskel
27Facebook: FastText
28GitHub: FastText
29News Room - The Facts: Non-Consensual Intimate Image Pilot
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different articles and described the project as ’far-fetched’.
It is still too early to evaluate the project and predict the public’s feedback towards it. Yet,
it is very interesting to note that depending on the Hash value of the picture will definitely
not be enough to match against, since it changes with on single pixel change/crop. Also,
it is not clear yet how far will there be interaction from Facebook personnel to evaluate
the results without having access to the main picture. Finally, how and for how long will
Facebook store these images before deleting them from the database !
2.3 Summary
Since 2008, many researchers have examined different methods to detect spamming
behavior and/or contents. Most of the techniques showed an accuracy above 75%. Yet,
none of them have explained in details how could they manage to not violate the right-to-
privacy of the spammers while using their profiles and contents!
The development of technology and technique every day will require a continuous re-
search and enhancement in the methods used to detect the spammers, and there will
always be no 100% one reliable algorithm to follow when dealing with human behavior.
Although many have examined well the twitter platform because of its nature that by
default shows all the contents in public, fewer have tested the Facebook platform that is
extensively taking over all the other social network platforms and even less have tried
unsupervised techniques with it.
On the other hand, Facebook research team has achieved a lot of progress in the spam
detection area over the years, that definitely helped the Facebook to be on the top of all
the social applications and platforms, with most number of users nowadays.
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3 Honeypot Implementation and Inspection
In this section, the author views the practical implementation of the social honeypots
and the peripheral tools used to gather the data and extract meta-data from the contents
derived from these honeypots to be used later as an input to the constructed classifier.
3.1 The Honeypot
3.1.1 Basic Implementation
For this research, 10 honeypot profiles were implemented on the Facebook platform, out
of which six were marked female profiles, and 4 males’. The profiles were created using
10-minutes mail addresses 30. The honeypots were claimed located in USA, Russian,
Estonia, Latvia and Poland. Profile pictures, ’about me’ sections, ’intro about me’ section,
information about education and more information were varied, some times similar to the
spammers that had already been found, sometimes to attract particular spammer group
the author had previously detected. Eight honeypots were deactivated by Facebook in
less than 4-weeks, including one that was deactivated the second step after registration!.
One honeypot, the very first, lasted 6.5 weeks and the other, the very last, is still active in
its 7th week as per the 1st of December, 2017.
3.1.2 The Star Honeypot
This was the first honeypot to be implemented. By far, it had the most traffic, received
most messages, highest number of friends and the most interaction with others. The
honeypot ’Avy’ was designed to be for an attractive girl who shares several of her photos
on her profile. The profile also included, available to the friend-list, her Gmail address
and a created blog that is listed as her website. Following a common pattern for such
created profiles, Avy had "Searching for Love" as an ’Intro’ in the About Me section and
marital status as Single.
The honeypot ’Avy’ was decided to be a passive one, i.e. it will not approach and add
friends, instead, will wait for other profiles to add her. Meanwhile, the profile joined
several groups, political, singers, and adult ones. Also Avy was actively liking and
commenting others’ posts in the groups and pages it joined. It also marked several events
as ’Going’ and registered for events through Eventbrite application31.
For a month, no one has added Avy as friend or approached it anyhow. Then, through
the profile, I have clicked on a malicious link on a suspicious profile shown in Fig. 24.
3010 Minute Mail
31Eventbrite
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Figure 24. Avy’s first malicious link
For not infecting my machine, this was done on a virtual machine to avoid the download
of any malware. The suspicious profile had 4115 friends and 1346 followers at that time.
Eight hours later, the profile had received 205 friend requests and more than 50 followers
(Fig. 25). All the profiles that sent the friend request had the owner of the malicious post
as a friend. In one week, Avy had more than 2000 friends, more than 1000 followers and
more than 900 friend requests pending approval.
Figure 25. Early stage - Avy’s friends
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3.2 The Blog
In order to provide more channels for the spammers to target the honeypot, the author
has created a blog on Blogger 32 and inserted its URL on the About Me section of the
honeypot Avy. The blog is monitored by Google Analytics 33 to analyze all the traffic
that passes through it. Google analytics also provides the feature of showing the referrals,
which are the times when someone visits the blog not through typing the direct link,
but instead by clicking on the blog’s URL from another page. For example, if someone
clicks on the blog’s address from the About Me section on the honeypot, the analysis
will show that someone was directed from a Facebook page to the blog.
To further ensure that the data is accurate, I have excluded my IP so that the analysis will
not consider my own hits. In 12 days there were very interesting results. Total number
of sessions on the blog were 28, out of which 7 only were through direct link, and the
blog was attacked twice!. The overview report of the blog’s traffic showed 2 suspicious
languages, Vitaly rules google and Congratulations to Trump and all americans, as
shown in Fig. 26. Interestingly, in the referrals report, same number of sessions were
showing suspicious entries because I did not place the blog address on these sources,
twitter.com and washingtonpost.com, as shown in Fig. 27. Both of the spams seem to be
spreading and many pages are being infected. Analytics-Toolkit explains the spams and
how to get rid of it in 2 main articles 34,35.
Figure 26. Languages of different sessions
Only 4 real users have clicked on the blog’s link placed on the Facebook honeypot. The
visitor were from Russia, Finland and USA.
32Blogger
33Google Analytics
34Analytics Toolkit - Vitaly rules google
35Analytics Toolkit - Language Spam
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Figure 27. Referral sources of different sessions
3.3 Data Collection
As mentioned earlier in section 1.4.2, Facebook graph API has limited the information
that can be extracted by the user, including the information they can graphically see
on their friend’s profiles. Therefore, most of the spammer and legitimate profiles’
information were extracted manually by the researcher.
From the honeypot’s friends, 100 profiles were selected from all the honeypot, all of
which had their attributes manually extracted to the database, then marked according to
the categories mentioned later in section 4.1, i.e. the social spammers’ different types.
Legitimate users were picked from the researcher’s circles of friends and colleagues to
ensure their legitimacy and assures their profiles’ variety, including home towns, different
posting patterns, and presence of advertisers. Luckily, this latter group had 30 profiles’
information extracted by the graph API as their owners had already installed the graph
API application before.
3.4 Analyzing the Contents
Using Facebook API, VirusTotal API and the curl command, the author have built a
code that extracts all (according to the set limit) the contents for the posts the honeypots
shared or were tagged in, including the comments. The code then organize the output in
JSON format using jq command and later extracts the URLs and/or the targeted words,
along with the name and ID for the user who posted it. If the extracted content is URL,
the code scan it over VirusTotal and detect its malicious ratio. The chosen words include,
’Click Here’, ’Vote’ , ’chat’, ... which were observed the most on the spammer profiles
harvested as well as the words detected earlier by Hailu Xu, Weiqing Sun, and Ahmad
Javaid [35] summarized in Fig. 28. The main limitation of the code is that the Facebook
API needs to be requested and updated in the code every 2-hours from the Graph API
Explorer36. The general flow of the code is summarized in Fig. 29.
36Facebook for Developers - Tools and Support
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Figure 28. Top 20 words features in the spam of Facebook [35]
| Facebook API t o k e n = " xxx "
| c u r l g e t l a s t 500 c o n t e n t b l o c k s p o s t e d r e l a t e d t o t h e u s e r
| j q
| g r ep u r l & saved words
| c u r l p o s t u r l t o V i r u s T o t a l
| I f comment was marked m a l i c i o u s , code o u t p u t s t h e owner ID & name .
Figure 29. General flow of the contents code.
3.5 Image Inspection
As mentioned earlier in section 2.2.1, Facebook developers have already reached an
advance level in detecting the objects in a posted photo. The algorithms’ results can
be checked using the ’inspect’ option while browsing Facebook using Google-Chrome.
Fig. 23 was captured from one of the honeypots friends’ wall.
Similarly, the objects were identified in the photos shown in Fig. 31 as per each’s caption.
Further examples extracted from photos with humans from both legitimate and spammer
profiles are shown in Fig. 32.
Although the algorithm is showing a high success rate in detecting objects (exceeds 95%
true-positive), it had not yet output the exact objects’ relationships, and orientation, e.g.
the algorithm does not detect if the photo contains full nudity or pornography.
As mentioned later in details, all the detection steps until the moment, does not detect
the photos with full nudity and pornography materials which violates the Facebook
community standards, and are widely used to attract users to click on malicious links.
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Figure 30. Image segmentation example: ’alt="Image may contain: tree, sky, plant,
outdoor and nature"’
3.6 Pornography detection
The Facebook has community standard when it comes to nudity 37. To by pass being de-
tected when sharing an explicit sexual content, the spammers sometimes show extremely
descriptive pictures as gray scale or as a cartoon. The nudity detection scripts available,
so far, detects nudity by checking the ratio of ’skin color’ in the photo. Having the
photo as grey scale or greenish cartoon easily pass the detection, unless it was personally
reported.
In many researches, nudity and pornography materials were proven the most attractive
bait to attract the spamming victims. There are several online codes that detect nudity,
unfortunately, all of them fail to differentiate between the pornographic materials or full
nudity and the swimming wear legitimate photos.
Still, the output of these codes along with the rest of indicators, may increase the preci-
sion of the spam detection. For example, if the URL posted on an image is malicious and
37Facebook Community Standards: Nudity
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(a) Image may contain: text and food
(b) Image may contain: meme and text
(c) Image may contain: plant, sky, grass, tree,
mountain, cloud, outdoor and nature
(d) Image may contain: dog
Figure 31. Examples for image segmentation. Photos captured from honeypot’s Home-
Feed
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Figure 32. Image May Contain: Examples of photos containing humans
the caption have the word ’click’ from one side and contains nudity from another side, it
is more likely to be a spam.
Different solutions include :
• Sightengine38 API can be used to detect nudity. More interestingly, the analyzer
can also detect if the photo contains a minor person (babies, children and teenagers
under 18). By testing it on the photos extracted from under-aged profiles attracted
by the honeypot, it successfully detected with at least 70% confidence that the
photos contained nudity and a minor person. Sightengine’ service can be integrated
using curl command, PHP, python, or Node.js.
• PicPurify39 could detect the difference between pornographic colored photos and
photos with nudity perfectly. Unfortunately, it severely fails to detect nudity or
pornography if the photo is in grey scale, or black-and white drawing, or in cartoon-
like display. PicPurify’s service can be integrated using curl command, python, or
Node.js.
There are many other online tools that provide their APIs for ease integration of their
service with your code, to either scan your local photos or the online ones but there is
always limitation of the maximum free calls you can make per time period. Generally,
the code (for curl) looks as follows :
| c u r l X GET G ' h t t p s : / / a p i . a n a l y z e r s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r . com / ' \
d ' models= n u d i t y , porn _ d e t e c t i o n ' \
d ' UserAPI=abc123 ' \
d ' u r l = h t t p s : / / xyz . j p g '
38Sightengine
39PicPurify
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4 Observations
In this section, the author presents the main observations made based on the manual
analysis of the approximately 4000 profiles that have added the different honeypots.
The author also summarizes the spam changing patterns that took place through the
research time. These observations were built on the author’s personal monitoring of the
profiles and the related traffic through the period December’2016 until October’2017.
Luckily, scanning the profiles and documenting their major insights proceed with faster
rate than manually extracting every single attribute into the database to further process
the information. After building an image of the observations outlined in this section, it
was easier to pick the 100 spammer profiles that participated in the first phase of the
classifier implementation for better distinguish results as mentioned in section 3.3.
4.1 Profile Authenticity
Below is a classification of the profiles based on the ownership of the profile by the
person claiming to be.
• A Spammer / Advertiser : Their behavior is quite similar except for the fact that the
spammer share malicious contents. They tend to ’market’ for their URLs through
posts, comments and private messages. More of their behavior is discussed later in
the paper.
• A Hisser: As Facebook is continuously improving its spam detection techniques,
more suspicious profiles are directed towards inviting ’friends’ and their network
to chat privately. The higher percentage of this kind of profiles are sharing their
Whatsapp numbers on their own profiles and on others’ comments that have been
posted in public groups or on a friend-of-a-friend profile rather than inviting them
to chat over the Facebook messenger. Spam detection over private messaging
according to message contents and sender-receiver relation has been covered
earlier in several researches [11, 13, 26].
• A Second Profile : From watching this kind of profiles, you can easily notice that
this is not the main profile for the person; instead, this profile is made for free
navigation through the Facebook pages and adding people away from the notice of
the people who already know the person. These people never have their photos on
the profiles, most of them do not have a real name set, for example ’lovely bird’,
and most of their friends are those on the same adult groups and profiles looking
like the honeypot, i.e. attractive girls, single, searching for love,....
• A Naive Profile : These are real profiles, adding the honeypot because they are
really looking for and believe deeply that they can ’connect’ with the girl and
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’get married’! They have their real friends, all information and continuously are
updating their profile with pictures of them with their families and co-worker at
various places. These profiles usually approach the honeypot persistently through
posts and private messages even if there is no answer.
Each of the previous types also have distinct messaging and direct-posting behaviors:
• Spammer/Advertiser:
– Advertise their pages/applications by sending URLs.
– Sends the malicious URLs.
• Hisser
– Share their private numbers, mostly Whatsapp numbers.
– Asks for friends’ Whatsapp numbers.
• Second Profile:
– Asks to send pictures.
– Sends nude pictures of themselves.
• Naive Profile:
– Communicate in their native language regardless the fact that the honeypot’s
language is EN-US.
– Thanks the honeypot profile for accepting their invitaion then invite her to
chat with them and provide their numbers.
– Gather several of their ’female friends’, including the honeypot, in a single
thread and message them all ’you are beautiful’, or ’I love you’, ...
4.2 Spamming Behavior
Due to the strong spamming filtration of Facebook, spammers cannot share directly a
malicious URL or code on their Facebook profiles. Instead, the URL, always shortened
before sharing, placed on Facebook directs to another address, most commonly a blog on
Blogger, and from their you are asked to click again on link to ’meet the girl’ and the
second URL often has a 5 minutes count-down timer, usually accompanied by dummy
survey, that is used to skip the scanning of the online anti-viruses, before you finally
reach the target URL. Still, the malicious URL can be detected using sandbox. All of the
second URLs seen by the honeypot referred to 2 main porn websites through different
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profiles and ’girls’.
Two types of malicious posts were noticed:
1. Direct-Content : URLs are shared in the caption of a photo/news/article that is a
porn material or contain nudity. And they can be further divided to:
(a) Those who share these materials on their own profiles, or directly message
the selected victims.
(b) Others whose profiles are very clean and they only share these contents as
comments on other pages/groups.
2. Indirect-Content : URLs are shared as caption of religious material! e.g. shared
news about the pope from Washington post with an added caption of ’check more
details at xxx.com’. The honeypot have also received several posts and private
messages addressing her religiously to re-consider her life-style and then at the
end of the message a URL of porn website is added.
More points to be noted:
• Once the post/URL is shared, instant virus/malware scanning may detect malicious
contents. If the URL is tested couple of days later, usually the scanner does not
detect any malicious behavior anymore. This most probably indicates that the
owners of the URL, the spammers, monitor the scanners and try to avoid detection
continuously.
• Facebook rules mention that "It’s against the Facebook Terms to use your personal
account to represent something other than yourself" 40. If the profile is targeted
to market a business, it should be converted into a Facebook page instead. In
other words, using profiles/fake-profiles to only spread and market a porn web-
site/business should be done through page and not through those profiles seen by
the honeypot.
4.3 Geographical Distribution
Although the honeypots created were ’living in’ Estonia, Latvia, USA, Russia and Poland,
as per the information filled in their profiles, it was interesting to note that the thousands
who have added the honeypots were located mainly (more than 90% of the profiles) in
Russia, India and central and south Africa! These including the spammers and legitimate
users who have added the honeypots. Generally speaking, the mentioned country of the
profiles attracted to the honeypots almost never overlapped with the honeypot itself!
40Facebook Help Center - Converting Your Profile Into a Facebook Page
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4.4 Sexual Preference
• While female honeypots attracted both female and male profiles to add them, male
honeypots received friend requests from male profiles only. All of these male
profile explicitly listed their gender as ’male’ and their interested-in as ’male’.
• Both straight female and male profiles mostly uploaded female-only pictures,
with very few uploading couples-picture as well, but none of them had male-only
pictures, even in their profile pictures.
• On the average, suspicious homosexual male profiles have the longest profile
ownership duration compared to suspicious straight male profiles, and all female
profiles. For example, while most of the harvested non-homosexual male profiles
joined only in mid-2017 and later, almost half the homosexual male ones dated
to beginning of 2015 and even before, with extensive number of fully-nude and
extremely pornographic photos on these profiles. It is to be noted here that one
major reason may be the number of ’report profile’ each profile receives.
• It is very common to find several homosexual male profiles with different names,
sharing same profile picture, most probably a grey-scale pornographic photo.
4.5 Child Abuse
According to United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and with 192 coun-
tries’ ratification, the child is a human being below the age of 18 years. Facebook does
not allow children less than 13 years old to create a profile on Facebook. Nevertheless,
without reporting the presence of a ’minor’ profile, there is no valid method to confirm
that the entered age during profile registration is the right one. This being said, it was
frustrating to detect clear signs of child abuse:
• Although primary students are maximum 11 or 12 years old, there are a lot of
primary students on the friend-list of the profiles marked as ’social spammers’.
• Children are sharing their Whatsapp numbers with strangers upon request! Most of
these requests are explicitly sexual and are inviting to talk privately on Whatsapp.
• On their profiles, these children are sharing nude photos for themselves and
extremely pornographic materials in black and white photos, that are detected,
after further investigation, on other adult friends on their friend-list.
• Three of the extremely most sexual profiles had more than 95% of their friends
underaged girls.
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4.6 Profile’s Personal Information
While on the other OSNs other researchers have documented the effort made in the
personal information and ’About Me’ sections which include location, age, education,
interests, quotes, information, and more about the profile’s owner, the author noticed that
no real interest of spammers to fill in these information on Facebook, instead it is often
left 80% empty. Nevertheless, all the spammers (except one profile) have listed their
’martial status’ as single.
Few more observations are :
• If occupation is either ’at Facebook’, ’Self’, or ’at home’. Interesting to question
why they did not leave it blank as the rest of their information.
• If education is mentioned, it is usually similar to ’Sex university’.
• If there are few words in the ’Intro to me’ section, it definitely contains one of the
words {love, sex, lust}.
4.7 Spam Pattern Change
During the the research and implementation time period of this research, over the years
2016 and 2017, it was clearly noticed the change in the spread of malicious URLs. Early
in 2016, it was easy to detect URLs that instantly direct to malicious sites upon clicking.
Later, most of the URLs were shortened URLs that directs to free-porn websites or blogs,
and from there you can find photo traps that invite you to click on them to ’meet the
girl’ and they direct you to malicious site or directly download an exe file. In the second
half of 2017, it was rare to find any of these two previous kinds of links. Number of
malicious (or pointing to malicious) links has dropped, and if ever found, it directs you
to what looks like a legitimate online store for clothes, which also have photo traps.
4.8 Photos’ Variety
As presented in section 3.5 there is a huge variety of non-nude pictures’ categories
extracted from the spammers’ profiles, including persons, animals, memes, food and
more. Other than the pornographic photos, it is hard to define another photo structure or
object linked to the spamming behavior.
4.9 Summary
In this section, the author has described the observations obtained from an 11-months
period of watching the traffic on Facebook platform through the eyes of the implemented
social honeypots, and has highlighted the evolution of spamming techniques through the
same time period.
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5 The Classifier
This section views the overall framework of the suggested classifier, describes details of
each node and the tunning target, and summarizes the final implemented classifier.
5.1 The Proposed Classifier
The overall framework for the classifier is summarized in Fig. 33 and each phase is
discussed below. Data collection was discussed earlier in section 3.3.
Figure 33. Overall Framework of the Classifier
5.2 Data Cleaning and Preparation
In this phase, the data should be prepared to be tested, this will include:
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• handling missing entries, e.g. profiles who do not have marital status. As inspired
by the paper [21], the missing values were completed using homophily theory 41.
"The similarity-attraction hypothesis [36] predicts that people are more likely
to interact with those with whom they share similar traits. The theory of self-
categorization proposes that people tend to self-categorize themselves and others
in terms of race, gender, age, education, etc., and that they use these categories
to further differentiate between similar and dissimilar others[37]. In addition,
because interpersonal similarity increases predictability of behavior and reduces
communication apprehension [38], so communications among similar others are
more likely to occur." [39].
Following the hypothesis, missing data was completed. For example
– If the sexual preference is not clearly mentioned, and friend list is mostly
gays + photos are similar to the ones shared by other gays profiles –> The
profile is marked as Homosexual male.
– If the profile does not clearly state the age, but most friends are less than 18,
+ similar shares + similar study conversation + targeted by same spammer –>
The profile is marked under 18-years old.
• describing photos in words, i.e. expressing the photos’ contents, e.g. natural scene,
nude, grey-scale,....
• changing discrete-valued attributes into numbers to decrease the overhead of
implementing text-mining steps for easier classification, e.g. 1 for single, 2 for
married, ...
5.3 Main Classifier
Different supervised machine learning algorithms were tested and results were docu-
mented to compare the ones with the highest accurate results. Section 6.2 presents the
top successful algorithms examined and their relevant output. The chosen algorithms are
listed below with the necessary R-package for each and a pseudo-code :
• KNN
f o r ( i i n 1 : k_ v a l i d ) {
N < t r a i n S i z e _Now
f o r ( i d x i n 1 :N) {
euc _ d i s t [ i d x ] < s q r t ( sum ( ( x_ t r a i n [ idx , 1 : 8 ] x_ v a l i d [ i
, 1 : 8 ] ) ^2 ) )
41Wikipedia - Homophily
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}s o r t e d _ d i s t _ s t r u c t < s o r t ( euc _ d i s t , i n d e x . r e t u r n = TRUE)
s o r t e d _ d i s t < s o r t e d _ d i s t _ s t r u c t [ [ 1 ] ]
s o r t e d _ pos < s o r t e d _ d i s t _ s t r u c t [ [ 2 ] ]
k n e a r e s t n e i g h b o r s = s o r t e d _ pos [ 1 : k ]
k n e a r e s t d i s t a n c e s = s o r t e d _ d i s t [ 1 : k ] ;
f o r ( j i n 1 : k ) {
A[ j , ] = x_ t r a i n [ k n e a r e s t n e i g h b o r s [ j ] , ] ;
M[ i , j ] = k n e a r e s t n e i g h b o r s [ j ] ;
}
domColor = mode (A[ , 9 ] )
check [ i ] < domColor
i f ( x_ v a l i d [ i , 9 ] ! = domColor )
{ e r r o r _ c a l c = e r r o r _ c a l c +1 }
}
• Classification Tree
| l i b r a r y ( r p a r t )
| f i t < r p a r t ( x_ t r a i n [ , 1 2 ] ~ . , d a t a = x , method=" c l a s s " )
• Naïve Bayes
| l i b r a r y ( e1071 )
| f i t < n a i v e B a y e s ( a s . f a c t o r ( x_ t r a i n [ , 9 ] ) ~ . , d a t a = x )
• Random Forests
| l i b r a r y ( r a n d o m F o r e s t )
| f i t < r a n d o m F o r e s t ( a s . f a c t o r ( x_ t r a i n [ , 9 ] ) ~ . , x , n t r e e =50)
• SVM
| l i b r a r y ( e1071 )
| f i t < svm ( x_ t r a i n [ , 9 ] ~ . , d a t a = x , t y p e = 'C c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ' )
• J48
| l i b r a r y ( RWeka )
| f i t < J48 ( a s . f a c t o r ( x_ t r a i n [ , 9 ] ) ~ . , d a t a = x )
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5.4 Weight-Based Classifier
Some noticeable association of attributes are used to increase the weight of an entry as a
spammer. Below is a list of several attributes’ values when associated together the profile
is most probably a spammer or a fake profile.
• Works as : self-employed, or, works-at-Facebook.
• Marital status : Single.
• Very short profile life-time, i.e. profile was created less than 5 months ago.
• Intro/Bio : searching for love.
• profile has some keywords, e.g. sins, sensation, hot, ...
• Number of mutual friends with the honeypot is 0 or 1. Each of these cases will be
given different weight, e.g. if 0 mutual friend, added weight is 4, and if 1 mutual
friend, added weight is 2. Else, no weight will be added.
The result from the previous node is checked, and if the the profile was marked ’legiti-
mate’, the classier double checks the profile’s attributes, if they matched in 4 out of the 6
aboves values, the profile is marked as a ’spammer’!
5.5 Rule-Based Classifier
If outliers were detected, the tunning of the classifier would have been condition-based,
i.e. if xxx then ’mark as spammer’, or if yyy then ’mark as legitimate’ and the condition
will over-write the previous result for this specific entry. Unfortunately, there were no
exact conditions to add that further decreases the wrongly classified data-points without
mis-classifying other points.
5.6 Final Classifier
Six different supervised machine learning algorithms were tested and tuned as displayed
in the earlier subsections and results were documented to compare the ones with the
highest accurate results. The classifier was able to distinguish between the spammers
and legitimate profiles but it could not precisely distinguish between different spammers’
kinds listed in section 4.1. Section 6.2 illustrates the classifiers’ results.
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6 Results
The final classifier was able to distinguish between the spammers and legitimate pro-
files but it could not precisely distinguish between different spammers’ kinds listed
in section 4.1. As mentioned earlier in section 1.4.3, 10-fold cross-validation is used
to minimize the inaccuracy resulted from the small data-size. The performance will
be presented in terms of four derivations of the confusion matrix (also known as error
matrix), Recall, Precision, F1-Score and Accuracy. Each terminology is explained
below before highlighting the average performance of each classification algorithm. The
result of each algorithm will be calculated as the average of results from ’searching for
legitimate profiles’ and ’searching for ’spammer profile’. More details will be displayed
in below, in section 6.1.
6.1 Performance Measurements
6.1.1 Confusion Matrix
Confusion matrix visualizes the results beyond general accuracy measurement, by sum-
marizing the output in 4 terms, ’True Positive’, ’True Negative’, ’False Positive’ and
’False Negative’. While a general accuracy of ’greater than 90%’ may sound good
enough, it is important to define the error more. For example, if the data set consists of
100 data points, out of which 90 belongs to class ’1’ and 10 to class ’0’, accuracy of 90%
looks extremely bad if the 10 errors are in classifying the ’0’ class, i.e. the model outputs
100% of the ’0’ class wrong, and does not distinguish 2 different classes. Fig. 34 shows
the confusion matrix used to drive the performance values in this section.
True Class
Positive Negative 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
Positive True Positive (T.P.) False Positive (F.P.)
Negative False Negative (F.N) True Negative (T.N)
Figure 34. Confusion Matrix Construction
The matrix is mapped below in Fig. 35 to reflect the relevant classes for the problem in
hand.
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Observed Class
Legitimate Spammer 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
Legitimate True Legitimate (T.P.) False Legitimate (F.P.)
Spammer False Spammer (F.N) True Spammer (T.N)
Figure 35. Confusion Matrix - Classes
6.1.2 Recall / Sensitivity
The probability that a randomly selected relevant document is retrieved in a search.
Recall =
∑
T.P.∑
(T.P.+ F.N)
6.1.3 Precision
The probability that a randomly selected retrieved document is relevant.
Precision =
∑
T.P.∑
(T.P.+ F.P )
6.1.4 F1-Score
The harmonic mean 42 of precision and recall.
F1-Score = 2× Precision x Recall
Precision + Recall
6.1.5 Accuracy
Accuracy =
T.P. + T.N.
T.P. + F.P. + T.N + F.N.
42Wikipedia - Harmonic Mean
43Wikipedia - Precision and Recall
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Figure 36. Precision and Recall 43
6.2 Classifiers Evaluation
6.2.1 KNN-Classifier
K-nearest neighbor, KNN, classification is considered one of the simplest machine
learning techniques, because it depends on Lazy Learning method which evaluates the
classification locally for each point in the data set, and so, is usually slower compared
to other techniques. KNN function uses distance between K-points in the training
set (where K is an integer larger than zero) and the point-to-evaluate to classify the
validation/testing sets. There are several metric functions to use in KNN algorithm, and
the best function is usually selected depending on the application, e.g. cosine distance is
used when comparing documents or vectors, or the best result during the training period,
i.e. function outputting least error. The tunning and choosing of the metric function
and the value of K should be wisely decided to avoid over-fitting of the model. For the
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current classification problem, euclidean distance with k=2 reflected the best average
results. Table. 1 shows the average performance of the KNN model at K=2,3,4. As
K-value increases further, the performance drops further.
Table 1. Performance of the KNN model
K-value / Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
K=2 (Legitimate) 0.9278 1 0.8421 0.9143
K=2 (Spammer) 0.9278 0.88 1 0.9936
K=2 (Average) 0.9278 0.94 0.9211 0.9540
K=3,4 0.9024 0.9412 0.8421 0.8889
6.2.2 Classification Tree
Decision Trees depend on recursively partitioning the data set to predict the dependent
variable. For discrete, finite dependent variables, Classification trees are used, while in
case of continuous dependent variables, Regression trees are used [40].
Table 2. Performance of the Classification Tree model
Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
Legitimate 0.9630 1 0.9091 0.9524
Spammer 0.9630 0.9412 1 0.9670
Average 0.9630 0.9706 0.9546 0.9597
6.2.3 Naïve Bayes
Naïve Bayes algorithm is based on the Bayes’ theorem that assumes strong independence
of features from each other:
P (A | B) = P (B | A)P (A)
P (B)
Table 3. Performance of the Naïve Bayes model
Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
Legitimate 0.9630 0.9167 1 0.9565
Spammer 0.9630 1 0.9375 0.9677
Average 0.9630 0.9584 0.9688 0.9621
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6.2.4 J48
Decision tree J48 is on of the algorithms developed by the WEKA44 project team.
Table 4. Performance of the J48 model
Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
Legitimate 0.9630 1 0.9090 0.9524
Spammer 0.9630 0.9412 1 0.9670
Average 0.9630 0.9706 0.9545 0.9597
6.2.5 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
A supervised machine learning technique that solves the classification problem by esca-
lating the input to higher dimensionality space (hyper plane) where separation of data
points and classification will be easier.
Table 5. Performance of the SVM model
Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
Legitimate 0.9630 1 0.9091 0.9524
Spammer 0.9630 0.9412 1 0.9670
Average 0.9630 0.9706 0.9546 0.9597
6.2.6 Random Forests
The technique depends on constructing multiple, de-correlated, decision trees (classi-
fication trees in this case) and outputting the average [41]. One of the most important
advantages of random forests technique is that increasing the number of trees, which
further increases the accuracy of the result, does not cause an over-fitting for the model
that cause the model to memorize the data rather than learn.
Fig. 37 shows the resultant error percentage as the number of trees differs. At 16 and 25
trees the error drops to 0.00%, while at 50 trees, the error is 3.7%.
Another, less optimistic, way to measure the error in this model will be to consider
the confusion matrix that is based on the OOB data. Out-of-bag (OOB) error use the
bootstrap aggregating, also known as bagging, to improve the accuracy and stability of
the model. Although it usually gives a higher error percentage than when actually tested
against the validation data, it outputs a more realistic results on which the model can be
better planned .
44WEKA
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Figure 37. Random Forests: Number of trees vs. error
Considering the OOB error, 18 trees shows an error of 19.2% in 70% of the cases and
up until 23.1% in the rest. Less number of trees shows a huge variation in the resultant
error, that exceeds 40% in some testing iterations. Nevertheless, As number of trees
increases over 18, there is no observed massive improvement in the error percentage.
Results driven using 50 to 500 trees are the same.
Table. 6 illustrates the average computations of the model with 18-trees v.s. 50-trees
driven from 500 iteration. When implementing the classifier on large-scale, it will be a
challenge to decide the social and statistical significances of the results’ differences and
whether they worth increasing the complexity of the model or not.
Table 6. Performance of the Random Forests model
# of Trees / Class Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
18-trees (Legitimate) 0.8450 0.7794 0.8766 0.8241
18-trees (Spammer) 0.8450 0.9412 1 0.9670
18-trees (Average) 0.8450 0.8603 0.9383 0.8956
50-trees (Legitimate) 0.8573 0.7754 0.9057 0.8349
50-trees (Spammer) 0.8573 0.9412 1 0.9670
50-trees (Average) 0.8573 0.8585 0.9529 0.9010
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6.2.7 Performance Summary
Table 7. Performance summary of the different classification models
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
KNN 0.9278 0.94 0.9211 0.9540
Classification Tree 0.9630 0.9706 0.9546 0.9597
SVM 0.9630 0.9706 0.9546 0.9597
Naïve Bayes 0.9630 0.9584 0.9688 0.9621
Random Forests 0.8450 0.8585 0.9529 0.9010
J48 0.9630 0.9706 0.9545 0.9597
6.3 Validation
In order to validate the results, the author compared the classifier’s performance against
available results from past researches to visualize how far the results lie within an
accepted performance range among the previous published researches. The previous
results are chosen from some of the most recent research papers:
• Fig. 38a summarizes the results of spam detection in the Facebook posts available
in the open public group named as “World of Taylor Swift” on Facebook in the
period: July 2015 to August 2015 [35].
• Fig. 38b shows the results driven from analyzing posts on closed Facebook groups
using Random Forests algorithm [27].
• Fig. 38c summarizes the results driven from analyzing the profile’s public fea-
tures [25].
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(a) Facebook public groups posts [35]
(b) Facebook closed groups posts [27]
(c) Based on profile public features [25]
Figure 38. Performance results from recent researches.
Table 8 compares the results from the honeypots against the ones driven from others.
Table 8. Summary of results driven from different attributes: Honeypots (implemented
in this research), PGP (Public Group Posts [35]), CGP (Closed Group Posts [27]), and
PPF(Profiles Public Feature [25])
.
Classifier Honeypots PGP CGP PPF
Bagging 0.848
Classification Tree 0.9597
J48 0.9597 0.810 0.93
KNN 0.9540 0.92
Logistic 0.705
MLP 0.91
Naïve Bayes 0.9621 0.95
Random Forests 0.9010 0.884 0.9815
Random Tree 0.753
SVM 0.9597
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7 Conclusion
Different researches have hunted spammers from different prospectives and using differ-
ent data and algorithms, but most commonly, the objective spammers were those who
use the social network to spread malicious contents like malwares. This research has
pursued a wider range of social spammers, including those who use the social platforms
to spread unapproved contents, harass other users, blackmail others for revenge, or start
a child pornography chain.
The results summarized in section 6.2 and validated in section 6.3 show that different
algorithms have resulted in F1-score value over 0.9 (most algorithms have output values
exceeding 0.95) which is compared to the other researches, lie on the top best results,
and is a promising start to tune the classifier even more for further better results. Still it
is needed to highlight that the spam pattern is continuously changing, and there is no one
technique that is always best detecting spam without any improvements.
On a different thought, it is complicated to evaluate how far the honeypot attracts only
spammers on Facebook platform. Reviewing the observations, it is obvious that the
most interested profiles are for people who are looking to start relationships or to browse
groups they are uncomfortable browsing publicly in front of their friends through their
main profiles. On one hand, this majority is a victim for the real spammers who aim at
spreading malicious harmful contents, but on the other hand, they are still considered
’social spammers’ to the rest of the Facebook community and are considered ’creepers’
by the Facebook team, as mentioned earlier in section 2.2.2.
The contribution of this work can be summarized as below:
• Illustrates the obstacles that inhibit the stability of the social honeypots on the
Facebook platform compared to another OSNs.
• Highlights the different spammers kinds trapped by the social honeypot and the
hazardousness of each.
• Presents a classifier implementation that distinguishes between legitimate Facebook
profiles and different social spamming profiles.
• Demonstrates characteristics and social attitudes of spammers on the Facebook
platform.
• Compares between the results from extracted from Facebook platform and those
from Twitter, and features the different spamming behavior on the different plat-
forms.
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Overall, the research answers in details the research questions mentioned in section 1.2,
and below are brief answers to those questions.
• Social honeypot implementation on Facebook platform is doable, with more
challenges than for those implemented on the other OSNs, because of the higher
security scan on Facebook platform that detects fraud profiles.
• The observations driven from the honeypots indicate their success to attract social
spammers only.
• The results illustrated in section. 6 suggests a promising classification of spammers
using the built classifier.
• The implemented classifier does not target only the spammers through text mining
to detect the ones spreading malicious contents, it also targets all kind of social
spammers who cause social inconvenience on the social networks.
• Finally, as shown in details in sections 2.1 and 6.2.7, the results of the implemented
classifier lie in the range of the results driven from Twitter platform, and mostly
exceed an F1-score of 0.95 .
Future Work
The work presented in this thesis has revealed different new challenges and more ques-
tions to address. This section is based on and extends unpublished work and research
done by the author to increase the robustness and applicability of the end classifier.
Create a PHP Application
In this research, bash scripting was used as a convenient main tool to integrate the
preparation steps before the classifiers implementation in R-Language, including APIs
calling, image inspection and URLs scan. Nevertheless, PHP will also ease the integration
of the manual extraction of data from the Facebook graph API as well as provide an
environment to perform automatically the rest of the steps45. It will be left later to
decide if the classifier as well will be implemented in PHP, or the application will
integrate the R code in the back-end. The main importance of the application is that
applications are given more freedom to use the Facebook graph API, after the approval
of the application’s user. Fig. 39 visualizes the ease to extract information through
the Graph API. Information provided are the ’about me’ section, full name, education,
birthday, gender, hometown, last checked-in location and work (including employer,
position, projects, colleagues, and start and end dates.
45Facebook SDK v5 for PHP
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(a)
(b)
Figure 39. Information extracted for one of the legitimate users using FacebookGraph
API
Define Spammers Closely
The classifier should be improved and tuned to output the exact kind of spammer detected
as per the classification observed in section 4.1 because every kind of spammers needs to
be dealt with differently. For example, a spammer who spread a malware or threatens a
child needs to be stopped immediately and reported, while creeper who adds everyone
and send them man messages needs to be educated about how to use the platform to be
convenient place for all.
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Appendix
I. Terms and Notations
K-fold Cross-Validation
The original sample is divided into k equal sized subsamples. The classification tech-
niques then takes place K-times where each sample get to be the "Validation Sample"
once and the other K-1 samples are used as Training Set. This gives the advantage to test
the robustness and the accuracy of the technique independent of the training/validation
sets’ structures.
Porter Stemmer
Stemming is the process of reducing the words to their word stem, base or root form. For
example, "fishing", "fished", and "fisher" will be reduced to the root word, "fish". Porter
stemmer, named after Dr. Martin Porter, is widely used as the standard algorithm used
for English stemming.
Bigrams Model
Bigrams algorithm depends on calculating the occurrence possibility of a word given the
preceding word.
P (Wn|Wn−1) = P (Wn−1,Wn)Wn−1
Supervised Learning
The learning algorithms that considers both the inputs and outputs. The model keeps
tunning for the best match to the output. On the contrary, unsupervised learning takes
in the inputs only and best fit the input according to its algorithms with no ground truth
information of the required output.
Huffman code
Huffman code is used for lossless data compression, because it assigns fewer number of
bits to encode the more frequent characters and vice-versa.
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II. Abbreviations
Abbreviation Phrase / Meaning
OSN Online Social Networks
URL Uniform Resource Locator
exe file extension for an executable file format
API Application Programming Interface
OOB Out-of-Bag
SDK Software Development Kit
SVM Support Vector Machine
BSD Berkeley Software Distribution
A.I. Artificial Intelligence
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